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Abstract
This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through
the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission
mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters con-
trary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact
of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by
which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper
presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment
costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational
choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying as-
sets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the
monetary authority aﬀects the process of financial intermediation through
its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying
government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs
are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show
that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the
economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the cre-
ation of credit in an economy. There is a vast literature on the transmission mech-
anism of monetary shocks. The empirical strand of this literature has identified
two stylized facts about the response of macroeconomic variables to unexpected
changes in the monetary conditions of the economy:
1. Monetary policy shocks may have sizeable impacts on aggregate activity;
and,
2. These eﬀects propagate over time, with responses of macroeconomic variables
having a hump shape that peaks at four to six quarters after the shock.
There is a growing theoretical literature that tries to build up models to generate
these two empirical facts. Usually, the modeling choices are as follows. To get
monetary policy to aﬀect the real activity in the short run, some sort of friction in
the model is needed. This is accomplished by assuming that agents cannot adjust
in the short run some nominal variable such as prices, wages or the asset compo-
sition of portfolios. It is typical in models with these features that responses are
immediate and last for a few quarters only. To propagate the impact of monetary
shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it
optimal to change their decisions slowly.
This paper presents another explanation of the two stylized facts mentioned
above that does not rely on any sort of stickiness or adjustment costs. Our inter-
pretation is based on the way credit is created and how the monetary conditions in
an economy aﬀect the process of financial intermediation. In our economy, there
is a population of agents who accumulate assets and choose between two diﬀerent
occupations. On the one hand, an agent may decide to be a worker which means
he will provide labor services and lend out his assets. On the other hand, an agent
may decide to be an entrepreneur. In this case, he will need to finance an invest-
ment plan but will face financial constraints in the form of collateral for the project.
Agents face idiosyncratic productivity shocks which generate an endogenous dis-
tribution of assets within the population. Because we assume decreasing returns
to scale, the inability of some entrepreneurs to achieve their optimal firm size due
to the financial constraint will result in an ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
In this economy, capital is distributed among agents through the use of nomi-
nal units of account created by financial intermediaries. Entrepreneurs with a low
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level of assets borrow these units of account to obtain extra capital for their firms.
In this sense, the nominal interest rate represents a cost of production. When cre-
ating credit, banks have to satisfy reserve requirements. The monetary authority
provides these banks with two types of liabilities: reserves and bonds. We show
that the relevant policy variable to determine the level of interest rates is the ratio
of liquid (reserves) to illiquid (bonds) liabilities of the central bank.
One of the crucial features that allows monetary shocks in our model to generate
a sizeable contemporaneous response of output is the existence of idle capital.
There are several possible interpretations to rationalize the presence of unused
resources. One is the limitations firms may encounter to modify their capacity
to produce goods in the short run. This may happen if firms face uncertainty
about demand at the time of capacity choices, an idea developed, among others,
by Fagnart, Licandro and Portier [11] and applied to a monetary environment by
Alvarez Lois [1]. This also may happen if there are costs of producing at full
capacity. To make our model simple, we pursue another interpretation. In our
model, the government needs to finance its liabilities. In the process it bids up
the interest rate and absorbs assets which otherwise would have ended up in the
production sector financing the use of productive capital.
An expansionary monetary policy is associated with an increase of reserves over
bonds. Financial intermediaries learn that the supply of reserves have increased
which gives them the possibility of expanding credit. However, the government is
borrowing less through debt so banks will have to give these credits to entrepre-
neurs. Given that the interest rate is a cost to entrepreneurs borrowing credits, the
only way to convince them to borrow more is by reducing the lending rate. This
change produces several eﬀects. First, some of the idle assets that were not used
before are now available to finance productive capital. Also, lower interest rates
make constrained firms borrow more and resources are moved from entrepreneurs
with low productivity to high productive ones. As the economy adjusts to the new
environment, aggregate variables behave in a way that resembles an expansionary
phase of the cycle.
We understand this mechanism depends on the existence of idle assets due to
the presence of reserves and bonds. However, we believe it should apply indepen-
dently of the reason why a proportion of the productive capacity of the economy
is not used to start with. The reason is that our mechanism works through a
channel which is present in any of these other interpretations, namely, an expan-
sionary monetary shock makes it cheaper to finance the use of productive capital
and, therefore, will push the economy towards a more intensive utilization of these
resources.
Since the seminal contribution of Bernanke and Gertler [2], a strand of the liter-
ature has analyzed the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions with mod-
els where financial constraints arise endogenously (see, among others, Bernanke,
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Gertler and Gilchrist [3], Carlstrom and Fuerst [7], Fuerst [12], Hubbard [13],
and Kiyotaki and Moore [15]). These papers, however, are representative agents
models. More recently, several papers study economies where financial constraints
interact with firms heterogeneity. In these models the endogenous distribution
of capital across firms is an important element in the aggregate properties of the
economies analyzed. In particular, Cooley et al. [9] develop a model with heteroge-
neous entrepreneurs subject to financial constraints to study the role of repudiation
of financial contracts for the diﬀusion and propagation of technological progress.
Jermann and Quadrini [14] use the same model as Cooley et al. [9] to analyze the
eﬀects of an improvement of expectations about technological innovations. They
show that just the prospects of an increase in the growth of productivity can gen-
erate an expansionary episode because of the benefits from reallocating capital
between constrained and unconstrained firms.
In another paper related to ours, Kiyotaki and Moore [16] analyze the busi-
ness cycle properties derived from monetary policy shocks. They are also able to
generate an endogenous distribution of firms but the mechanism is diﬀerent from
ours. The main focus of their paper is to have money demanded from first princi-
ples. To obtain that, investors in their economy receive random opportunities to
produce new capital goods from consumption goods. These idiosyncratic shocks
generate the heterogeneity across investors and the need to transfer funds from
the agents without investment opportunities to the ones who have them. How-
ever, old capital is illiquid in the sense that it cannot be fully used to finance these
investment projects. Under these circumstances, money may have a value in such
an economy since it can speed up trade among agents. The authores then look at
the qualitative properties of the dynamic response of the economy to technology
and monetary shocks but do not perform any quantitative analysis.
Another paper that is close to ours is Cooley and Quadrini [10]. These au-
thors construct a model where firms heterogeneity results from borrowing limits
on the funds needed by firms to expand their business. The model incorporates
a nominal sector and a limited participation constraint on the part of households
when deciding their deposits at financial intermediaries. This constraint allows the
central bank to aﬀect the nominal interest rate in the short run and to induce a
persistent movement in output through the financial decisions of firms. They find
that although quantitatively the aggregate impact is small, the response of small
and large firms diﬀers substantially.
The transmission mechanism in our model is similar to the one in Cooley et
al. [9], Jermann and Quadrini [14], and Monge [20]. That is, a financial constraint
makes entrepreneurs with low levels of assets run their firms at a smaller size than
what is optimal. Thus, any perturbation that reduces the cost of capital is expan-
sionary and, as assets take time to accumulate, the response of constrained firms
propagate over time. However, compared with these three papers, we concentrate
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on nominal, monetary policy shocks. Unlike Kiyotaki and Moore [16], we motivate
a demand for nominal units of account through a cost of information gathering
argument similar to the one proposed by Lucas [18]. As in Cooley and Quadrini
[10], we assume imperfect capital markets in the form of an endogenous borrowing
limit but we do not need a limited participation constraint for the monetary au-
thority to aﬀect the nominal interest rate. Instead, the central bank introduces a
reserve requirement which regulates the amount of intermediation in the economy.
We want to stress that by carefully modelling the nominal side of the economy,
there is no need to impose stickiness on any variable since the economy propagates
shocks by itself. Furthermore, we provide our agents with an occupational choice
to decide whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur. This modelling strategy
allows us to examine the role that endogenizing the extensive margin of investment
decisions has for the monetary transmission mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some new evidence on the
eﬀects of monetary shocks on economic activity. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 presents the numerical simulations and section 5 concludes.
2 The Eﬀects of Monetary Shocks on Economic Activity
The empirical literature on the monetary transmission mechanism has concluded
that an expansionary monetary shock drives down nominal interest rates which
makes output rise. The price level responds slowly to these changes and ends up
increasing in the long run. Although there is a general consensus about these
qualitative eﬀects, the profession has yet to agree on a single set of identification
restrictions to isolate monetary shocks in the data and, therefore, the quantitative
estimations of these eﬀects vary widely across papers.
Figure 1 presents the responses of the capacity utilization rate, the growth
rate of the GDP deflator and the 3-month T-bill rate to a monetary shock that
occurs at period 1. These responses are estimated using the scheme employed
in Menner and Rodríguez Mendizábal [19].1 The identification strategy is based
on the sign restrictions of the responses of these variables to three diﬀerent types
of shocks (demand, supply and monetary) imposed by theory. Because all three
variables are percentages, the responses are measured as diﬀerences with respect to
average values. So, for example, an expansionary monetary shock that reduces the
interest rate by 50 basis points, raises capacity utilization from its average of 81.15
percent to 81.40 percent or 0.25 percentage points. For comparison purposes, the
figure also includes the responses estimated with the identification scheme used in
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [8] (CEE) which represents a method widely
1The sample covers from the first quarter of 1960 to the first quarter of 2003
(173 observations).
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used in the literature.2
One diﬀerence between the two schemes is that capacity utilization and prices
are restricted not to respond contemporaneously to a monetary shock in the CEE
estimation. However, we provide an alternative to the estimation by CEE since, as
Canova and Pina [6] show, it is very hard to rationalize theoretically the zero re-
strictions imposed by triangular identification schemes. Any theoretical model, in-
cluding the one described below, predicts all endogenous variables to have nonzero
contemporaneous correlations through the impact of the fundamental shocks. As
the sign restriction method shows, once the zero restrictions are relaxed a mone-
tary shock can have important contemporaneous eﬀects on real variables such as
the capacity utilization rate.
Nevertheless, we observe the two estimations to be fairly similar both in size
and persistence of the responses. In particular, the sign restriction estimation
implies that an expansionary monetary shock is associated with a reduction of
interest rates of about 50 basis points on impact and this variable stays below
average for about 9 quarters. This movement in interest rates is accompanied by
a sizeable and persistent eﬀect on capacity utilization with a peak at around 7
quarters where the use of installed capacity rises by 0.7 percentage points. Finally,
prices react slowly.
Table 1 provides evidence on a possible channel through which the monetary
shock operates. It presents the results from regressing two policy variables, namely
the growth rate of the Fed holdings of government securities (FEDSEC) and the
growth rate of nonborrowed reserves (NBR), on a constant, four lags and the
monetary shock estimated through the sign restriction scheme described in the
previous paragraphs. A monetary shock that unexpectedly reduces interest rates
generates a statistically significant increase in both, the Federal Reserve holdings of
government securities as well as nonborrowed reserves.3 This finding supports the
idea that a monetary shock is associated with a change in the assets and liabilities
composition of the Fed’s balance.
In the next section we build a model to capture these empirical facts. In our
economy real assets may be used as productive capital. Agents with low levels
of wealth borrow assets using units of accounts created by commercial banks.
2For the CEE identification scheme a six variable VAR(4) was estimated which
included, in the following order, capacity utlization, the growth rate of the GDP
deflator, the growth rate of a commodity price index, the federal funds rate, the
growth rate of nonborrowed reserves and the growth rate of total reserves. The
monetary shock estimated with this scheme has a correlation of 71 percent with
the shock estimated with the sign restriction approach.
3These results are robust to a wide variety of specifications that include the
variables in levels as well as other sources of shocks.
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However, the process of intermediation makes some of these assets to remain idle.
This is due to the government and the central bank using some of these units of
account. We interpret the ratio of productive capital to real assets as capacity
utilization. Furthermore, the central bank in our model has the ability to aﬀect
the proportion of assets employed as capital by changing the amount of units of
accounts used in the financial sector. Monetary policy is conducted by buying
and selling government bonds in exchange for reserves which commercial banks
need in order to intermediate between borrowers and lenders. In this way, we
deviate from standard macro models that assume central banks to directly control
broad monetary aggregates. Instead, we distinguish between narrow and broad
definitions of money and incorporate a more realistic implementation of monetary
policy through the use of open market operations. We show this addition has
important implications for the neutrality of money.
3 The Model
The model is a nominal version of Bohácˇek [5]. In this economy there is a con-
tinuum of agents with mass one. These individuals may diﬀer in the amount of
accumulated assets and in their productivities. Each agent has access to a decision
on whether to allocate his talent to an entrepreneurial activity or to use it as a
worker. There is also a corporate banking sector in the business of intermediating
between agents with an excess of funds and agents with liquidity needs. Finally,
there is a central bank that designs monetary policy.
Each agent is endowed with a unit of time and evaluates streams of consumption
(ct) with the utility function
E
" ∞X
t=0
βtu (ct)
#
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) and u : <+ → < is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and twice diﬀerentiable continuous function that satisfies the Inada conditions. At
the beginning of every period, agents are identified by a level of accumulated assets
a ∈ A = [0,∞) and by an idiosyncratic productivity shock z ∈ Z = [z, z]. This
productivity level is carried from the previous period and represents a signal for
the eﬀective productivity the agent will have later in the period when production
takes place, z0 ∈ Z.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the central bank decides on the mon-
etary policy stance defined as the composition of government liabilities. Second,
agents make an occupational choice and decide whether to be a worker or an en-
trepreneur. Workers deposit their assets at the financial intermediaries and oﬀer
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their labor services in the market. Entrepreneurs decide how much capital and
labor to demand. Banks are in the business of intermediating between suppliers
of capital, that is, all workers as well as the entrepreneurs with assets in excess of
their investment needs, and demanders of capital, that is, entrepreneurs who want
to expand their business above the level of their accumulated assets. Finally, at
the end of the period, productivities for the period (z0) are realized and production
takes place. Then, workers are paid their wages, entrepreneurs realize profits and
interests are paid on loans and deposits.
If an agent decides to be a worker, he will draw his eﬀective skill, z0, from a
fixed distribution ψ(z0). The revenue from working is z0w where w is the wage per
unit of productivity. Each agent who decides to be entrepreneurs will draw his
productivity level from a Markov process with transition function Q(z, z0). The
Markovian nature of the entrepreneurial skills is assumed to reflect the learning
aspects of entrepreneurial activity as documented by Quadrini [21]. Furthermore,
we assume Q to be monotone and to satisfy the Feller property. Entrepreneurs
hire capital (k) and labor (n) in a competitive fashion and produce according to
the production function
y = z0f (k, n) = z0
¡
kαn1−α
¢θ
, (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and θ < 1. The production function exhibits decreasing returns
to scale which, as in Lucas [17], can be thought of as capturing the presence of
decreasing returns to managerial control. Capital used in production depreciates at
the rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The productivity shocks are drawn from the same set Z = [z, z],
both for workers and entrepreneurs. It is assumed that entrepreneurs with the
lowest signal remain with that level of productivity [Q(z, z) = 1], so that those
agents always prefer to become workers. To guarantee that some entrepreneurs
exit that occupation, we also assume that Q(z, z) > 0, for all z ∈ Z.
Given the distribution of assets and productivities among agents, there will be
some of them who will not want to use all their assets. These are all the workers
and the entrepreneurs who expect to have low relative levels of productivity or
who have relative high levels of initial assets. On the other hand, entrepreneurs
who expect to be very skillful but have relatively low levels of assets will like to use
more capital than what they can finance by themselves. The commercial banks
are in the business of connecting people expecting to have idle assets with people
who want to expand their firms above the level of their accumulated assets. One
problem in this economy is that workers cannot take their assets to where they
work. So, some of the workers may be working with an entrepreneur who does not
borrow at all or who borrows from other agents. Also, there may be entrepreneurs
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lending to other entrepreneurs. This means some agents in this economy may be
lending assets to some other agents they never see.
One additional diﬃculty is that there is a continuum of these agents. Banks
have to keep track of all the capital exchanges among agents, and this may be
expensive. As in Lucas [18], one possibility that reduces the cost of following bor-
rowing and lending is to record balances only and to forget about the information
of who borrows from whom. These balances are maintained in a unit of account
called “credit” created by banks in the process of intermediation. Entrepreneurs
in need of capital borrow these units of account to rent capital from the rest of
agents who deposit these credits in accounts at the bank. These credits exchange
for capital goods at a nominal price P . Depositors receive a nominal rate RD per
credit deposited and borrowers pay a nominal rate RL per credit borrowed. When
these rates are received, the credits are exchanged for capital goods at the price P .
At the beginning of each period, the representative bank has a supply D of these
credits to be determined below. Also notice that, when production takes place,
workers are in the firms to collect the goods so there is no need for a medium of
exchange for consumption goods and wages.
There are two costs of being an entrepreneur. On the one hand, there is the
opportunity cost of foregone wages which represent an endogenous barrier to entry
for entrepreneurs. In this sense, it will determine a minimum size of the firm below
which it is more profitable to become a worker. On the other hand, we assume
full information and no possibility of default in financial contracts.4 Because the
sizes of the firms have to be chosen before eﬀective skills for the period are known,
there is always the risk of drawing a low productivity shock and realizing negative
profits that have to be paid for with the entrepreneur’s own assets. The Inada
assumption for the utility function together with default not being possible force
entrepreneurs to guarantee that consumption is strictly positive for all realizations
of the productivity shock. Thus, when deciding the dimension of the firm an
entrepreneur may be constrained by the amount of accumulated assets which serve
as collateral to cover potential negative profits in case the entrepreneur is unlucky
enough and draws the lowest productivity shock. Since we assume that Q(z, z) > 0
for all z ∈ Z, all entrepreneurs will need to have some collateral when financing
investment projects.
After the labor income and profits are realized, agents decide on how much
to consume (c) and the amount of physical assets (a0) that they will take to next
period. This period’s shock z0 is also carried as next period’s signal for future
productivity shocks. The problem of an agent who enters the period with the pair
4This could be motivated by the existence of limited commitment on the part
of borrowers in repaying the loans as in Cooley et al. [9].
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(a, z) can be summarized by the value function
v (a, z) = max
½Z
vW (a, z0)ψ (dz0) ,max
k,n
Z
vE (a, z0)Q (z, dz0)
¾
,
where
vi (a, z0) = max
c,a0
[u (c) + βv (a0, z0)]
with i =W,E indexing the type of agent, either worker (W ) or entrepreneur (E).
The worker’s budget constraint is
c+ a0 ≤ (1− δ) a+ R
DPa
P
+ wz0,
or
c+ a0 ≤ (1− δ) a+RDa+ wz0,
where w is the real wage. For the entrepreneur, the budget constraint is
c+ a0 ≤ (1− δ) a+ πE,
with real profits equal to
πE = z0f (k, n)− wn+ R
Dmax [0, Pa− Pk]
P
− R
Lmax [0, Pk − Pa]
P
,
or
πE = z0f (k, n)− wn+RDmax [0, a− k]−RLmax [0, k − a] .
Notice agents make their occupational and production decisions after observing the
market interest rates RD and RL but before their productivities (z0) are realized
for the period. When deciding on the size of the firm, the entrepreneur has to
satisfy the financial constraint
wn+RLmax [0, k − a] < (1− δ) a+ zf (k, n) +RDmax [0, a− k] (2)
by which it is ensured that the production costs are covered even for the lowest
productivity level. Thus, an agent with an initially low level of assets (a) but with
the prospects of having good skills (a high expected z0) may not be able to reach
the optimal size of the firm because of the possibility of drawing a low realization
of his productivity and realizing negative profits he will not be able to cover with
his accumulated assets.
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Summarizing, each period agents first make decisions based on their individual
state (a, z) and the prices of the economy. These decisions are whether to become
a worker or an entrepreneur and the amount of labor, n (a, z), and capital, k (a, z),
to hire. Then, after productivity for the period (z0) is revealed, they decide how
much to consume, c (a, z0), and how many assets to transfer to the next period,
a0 (a, z0). At the aggregate level, the equilibrium outcome of these decisions is a
probability measure λ that determines the density of agents with each combination
of productivities z and capital a. This measure evolves as
λ0(A0,Z 0) =
Z
S
∆ (z, dz0)λ(da× dz),
where S = {(a, z0) : a0(a, z0) ∈ A0 and z0 ∈ Z 0} and ∆ is a transition selector
∆ (z, dz0) ≡ Q(z, dz0)|E + ψ(dz0)|W
that determines the end of period productivities from the beginning of period
productivities. This transition selector is endogenous because how productivities
change within the period is diﬀerent between workers and entrepreneurs, and this
occupational choice is a decision of the agents. So, from the law of motion of λ
the measure of agents with next period’s state in the set (A0, Z 0) are those whose
skills evolve to the set Z 0 and whose optimal decision is to accumulate assets that
belong to the set A0.
The problem of the banking sector is to maintain the nominal portfolio of the
economy. The balance sheet of a representative bank is
D = L+Hd +Bd
where D are deposits (sources of funds for the bank), L denotes the loans to
entrepreneurs,Hd is the demand for reserves at the central bank, andBd represents
certificates of deposits and other forms of lending to the public sector. Reserves
earn no interest. Banks have to hold them because there is a requirement that
links the amount of deposits they can provide with the amount of reserves they
own5
Hd = ρD.
5The reserve requirement can be interpreted in literal terms for countries where
this regulation is in place or as a reserve demand for settlement accounts for
payment systems in countries without such a rule.
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Certificates of deposits are remunerated at the nominal rate RB. Banks are risk
neutral and the financial sector is competitive. So, the problem of a representative
bank is to maximize profits from intermediation
max
L,Bd,D,Hd
ΠI = RLL+RBBd −RDD
subject to
D = L+Hd +Bd
and
Hd = ρD. (3)
Because of the financial constraint imposed on borrowers, banks face no risk. Also,
the problem of the bank shows the role of government liabilities. Reserves are used
to expand deposits. On the other hand, certificates of deposits deviate units of
accounts from the private sector’s financing of firms to the central bank. This
implies that some of the assets deposited in the financial intermediary will remain
idle in the sense that they will not be used by entrepreneurs to acquire productive
capital. Bank optimization implies
RD
1− ρ = R
B = RL.
Finally, the central bank decides on the composition of its nominal liabilities.
At the beginning of each period, the central bank supplies the economy with
H units of liquid assets (reserves) and B units of illiquid assets (certificates of
deposits). Call X = H + B, the total liabilities of the central bank. We assume
the central bank increases government liabilities to pay for the interest rates of its
certificates of deposits. The budget constraint of the central bank is then,
X 0 = X +RBB.
The decision of the central bank is the composition of the new liabilities, that is,
how to split X 0 between H 0 and B0.
3.1 The stationary equilibria
We first look at the determination of the stationary equilibria. Since nominal
variables are growing, it will be convenient to normalize them by the total level
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of government liabilities, X. Such normalized variables will be denoted by lower
case letters. So, define
h =
H
X
; b =
B
X
; p =
P
X
,
with h + b = 1. At a steady state, the central bank keeps h and b fixed forever.
This means, all liabilities of the central bank, together with all nominal variables,
grow at the same rate equal to
µ =
H 0 +B0
H +B
= 1 +
RBB
H +B
= 1 +RBb.
Notice that the central bank does not pursue policies where its liabilities grow
exogenously. The growth rate of these liabilities, µ, and therefore the inflation
rate, is linked to the interest rate and the number h. There is also a stationary
probability measure λ that determines the density of agents with each combination
of productivities z and capital a. So, this measure should satisfy
λ(A0,Z 0) =
Z
S
∆ (z, dz0)λ(da× dz),
with S = {(a, z0) : a0(a, z0) ∈ A0 and z0 ∈ Z 0} and ∆ being the transition selector
defined above.
With these elements, we can define the steady state of this economy.
Definition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is constant prices
(RD, RL, RB, w, p), a constant growth rate for nominal prices µ, value functions
[v (a, z), vW (a, z), vE (a, z)], policy functions [k (a, z), n (a, z), c (a, z0), a0 (a, z0)],
a probability measure (λ) and a transition selector [∆ (z, dz0)] such that given the
policy of the central bank (h, b, ρ),
1. at given prices the policy functions solve the optimization problem of each
agent (a, z),
2. the probability measure λ is time invariant,
3. the aggregate asset level is constant
A ≡
Z
a0 (a, z0)∆ (z, dz0)λ (da× dz) =
Z
aλ (da× dz) .
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4. markets clear: labor,Z
W
z0∆ (z, dz0)λ (da× dz) =
Z
n (a, z)λ (da× dz) ,
deposits,
1
ρ
h = p
Z
W
aλ (da× dz) + p
Z
E
max [0, a− k (a, z)]λ (da× dz) , (4)
and loans, µ
1
ρ
− 1
¶
h− b = p
Z
E
max [0, k (a, z)− a]λ (da× dz) , (5)
5. the aggregate feasibility constraint holds at equalityZ
[c (a, z0) + a0 (a, z0)]∆ (z, dz0)λ (da× dz)
=
Z
(1− δ)aλ (da× dz) +
Z
z0f [k (a, z) , n (a, z)]Q (z, dz0)λ (da× dz)
6. and the gross growth rate of nominal prices is
µ = 1 +RBb.
Of course, by Walras’ Law, one of these conditions is redundant. In this definition,
it is implicit that the markets for central bank’s certificates of deposits and reserves
clear. Once we know these variables, the price level is determined from
P = Xp.
Notice also the model is neutral with respect to changes in government lia-
bilities as long as the central bank changes certificates of deposit and reserves
proportionally. That is, for any proportional change in (H,B), individual deci-
sions are not aﬀected, so the equilibrium is the same in terms of real or normalized
variables and the only diﬀerence is a change in the nominal price level P . One
way to see the determination of the price level is as a ratio of the units of account
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loaned to entrepreneurs with respect to the capital they obtain with those units
of account. In other words, from (5) we have that
P =
LR
Emax [0, k (a, z)− a]λ (da× dz)
.
The total supply of units of account is determined from the balance sheet of com-
mercial banks, µ
1
ρ
− 1
¶
H = L+B,
where we have used (3) to substitute for deposits in equilibrium. That is, total
units of account serve to finance either the use of capital by entrepreneurs (L) or
government debt (B). On the other hand, the supply of real assets to be used for
capital only depends upon the interest rates RD and RL. A proportional increase
in government liabilities (H and B) implies a proportional increase in the supply
of loans which support the same allocation of real assets and the same equilibrium
provided nominal prices increase also proportionally.
We can also see that there is a continuum of stationary equilibria indexed by
the reserve to total government liabilities ratio, the number h, as well as the reserve
requirement ρ. Diﬀerent values of the pair (h, ρ) are associated with stationary
equilibria with diﬀerent proportions of government liabilities, diﬀerent interest
rates, diﬀerent price levels and diﬀerent inflations. At one extreme, as ρ goes to 0
and h goes to 1 the model converges to the real economy of Bohácˇek [5]. Keeping
h = 1, as we increase ρ, we introduce a gap between borrowing and lending rates
and one of the frictions that reduce financial intermediation appears. On the other
hand, keeping ρ constant, as we start decreasing h, the central bank takes nominal
resources from the economy and there are less credits to be used to finance capital
acquisitions. For that to be the case, and in order to convince savers to give their
credits to the central bank, rates must go up. In the limit, when h is 0, we go
to autarchy (in this case, there is no intermediation). Thus, keeping ρ constant,
an increase in h should be associated with a steady state where interest rates are
lower. It turns out that for low values of ρ, such as the one used in the calibration
exercise we conduct, the stationary interest rate is close to the value in Bohácˇek [5]
for most of the values of h. Below we analyze the transition between these steady
states.
3.2 The occupational choice
In this economy, agents have to make the occupational choice given the interest
rates (RL, RD), the real wage (w) and the individual characteristics summarized
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by the accumulated level of assets (a) and the productivity signal (z). The oc-
cupational choice is made by comparing the expected present discounted utility
obtained from being a worker with that of being an entrepreneur subject to the
financial constraint (2). To guarantee the existence of a stationary recursive equi-
librium with a positive fraction of the population in each occupation we need to
impose the next two assumptions:
Assumption 1. The upper bound for the signal ability shock, z, is such that
there exists an asset level as for whichZ
vW (a, z0)ψ (dz0) ≤
Z
vE (a, z0)Q (z, dz0)
for all a ≥ as.
Assumption 2. The lower bound for the signal ability shock, z, is such thatZ
vW (a, z0)ψ (dz0) ≥
Z
vE (a, z0)Q (z, dz0)
for all a ∈ A.
The first assumption requires a suﬃciently high productivity shock so that agents
with accumulated assets above a threshold value as become entrepreneurs. This
is because the expected value of creating a firm is larger than the expected value
of being a worker. The second assumption imposes the opposite condition. If
an agent receives the lowest signal, he will always choose to become a worker
independently of his accumulated asset level or prior occupation.
The properties of the value functions v(a, z), vW (a, z), and vE(a, z) depend
upon the assumptions on the transition functions ψ and Q and the utility function
that follow the analysis in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [22]. All value functions,
vi(a, z0) for i = E,W , are increasing in both arguments since the utility function
is strictly increasing and strictly concave and the agent’s constraint set is strictly
increasing in assets and the ability shock. Furthermore, the expected value for
workers is independent of the productivity z and is an increasing and continuous
function of a. On the other hand, the expected value function of entrepreneurs
is an increasing and continuous function of both a and z. This is due to the
assumption on Q being monotone and satisfying the Feller property. Finally, the
value function v(a, z) is non-decreasing in z and strictly increasing in a.6 The
properties of the value function together with assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that for
6The value function v(a, z) is the outer envelope for the value functions at
each shock level and may not be a concave function even if the value functions
of workers and entrepreneurs are. The operator on the value function satisfies
Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction mapping.
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all levels of the signal z there is either none or at most one level of accumulated
assets as(z) above which agents become entrepreneurs.
3.3 Entrepreneurial decisions and financial intermediation
As mentioned above, entrepreneurs have to decide on the size of their firms before
they know their productivity levels for the period. Given the assumed properties
of the utility function and the assumptions of full information and no possibility of
default, any entrepreneur will choose productive capital, k, and labor, n, so that
consumption levels are nonnegative for all possible realizations of shocks. This
means that entrepreneurial decisions are taken so that
wn+RLmax [0, k − a] ≤ (1− δ) a+ zf (k, n) +RDmax [0, a− k] . (6)
This constraint implies that entrepreneurs with a low level of accumulated assets
may be constrained and run their firms below their optimal size. Nevertheless,
because of the properties assumed for Q, becoming an entrepreneur has a future
value. That is, an entrepreneur is willing to sacrifice current consumption for
having the possibility of starting a career that increases the firm’s return over
time. The way to obtain this return profile is by investing a large share of his
income and wealth so as to relax the credit constraint in order to run the firm at
its optimal size.
There are two frictions that aﬀect the production decisions of entrepreneurs.
The first distortion is characterized by the financial constraint (6) which makes
some entrepreneurs run projects with size lower than what it is eﬃcient. To under-
stand the role of the financial constraint, let R be the opportunity cost of capital
which could be equal to RL or RD depending on whether the entrepreneur is a
borrower or a depositor. For an unconstrained agent, the first order conditions
with respect to inputs are given byZ
u0(c) [z0fk (k, n)−R]Q(z, dz0) = 0
and Z
u0(c) [z0fn (k, n)− w]Q(z, dz0) = 0.
These two expressions produce the optimal capital to output ratio, q. For the
production function (1), the optimal capital to output ratio is given by
q ≡ k
u (z)
nu (z)
=
µ
α
1− α
¶
w
R
.
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Notice q is independent of the individual state of the agent. Also, implicit here is
the fact that because the agent is unconstrained, the choice of capital and labor do
not depend on the asset level of the agent and only change with the productivity
signal, z. However, it may occur that the financial constraint (6) does not hold for
this choice of inputs, that is,
wnu (z) +Rku (z) > (1− δ +R) a+ zf [ku (z) , nu (z)] .
In this case, it is still optimal to keep the same capital to labor ratio q and the
constrained level of labor (and, implicitly, the level of capital) is determined from
the expression
wnc (a) +Rqnc (a) = (1− δ +R) a+ zf [qnc (a) , nc (a)] .
The skill and asset levels of an individual aﬀect both his occupational decision
and the financial constraints he faces if he becomes an entrepreneur. Giving a skill
level, z, the larger the asset position of an agent the more benefits he has from
becoming an entrepreneur. So, for each value of the signal z there is a critical
level of assets, call it as(z), such that for a > as(z) the agent decides to be an
entrepreneur and for a < as(z) the agent decides to be a worker. Furthermore,
for a given skill level, the financial constraint is more likely to bind as the assets
of the agent are lower. So, there is another level of assets, call it ac(z), such
that, if the agent is an entrepreneur, for a > ac(z) he is financially unconstrained
and for a < ac(z) the agent is financially constrained. Thus, entrepreneurs with
skill z and assets in the interval [as (z) , ac (z)] are constrained and their demands
of inputs are an increasing function of accumulated assets. Entrepreneurs with
assets a > ac(z) have demands of inputs which are independent of the level of
wealth and only depend on the productivity signal z. By the same intuition, given
the level of assets, as the productivity signal gets larger, it is more profitable to
become an entrepreneur and it is more likely that entrepreneurs are financially
constrained. This means that any shock making financial markets more liquid or
credit cheaper will reallocate assets towards constrained entrepreneurs and will, in
general, increase the aggregate level of productivity of the economy.
The second distortion is the spread between borrowing and lending rates due
to the reserve requirement. For an unconstrained entrepreneur who is borrowing,
the relevant opportunity cost of capital is RL. This means that his optimal capital
to labor ratio is
qL ≡ k
Lu (z)
nLu (z)
=
µ
α
1− α
¶
w
RL
.
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where kLu is the capital demand of a lender who is unconstrained and nLu is the
corresponding demand for labor. On the other hand, an entrepreneur who is also
unconstrained but has assets in excess of his needs, will be a depositor and the
corresponding capital to labor ratio will be
qD ≡ k
Du (z)
nDu (z)
=
µ
α
1− α
¶
w
RD
> qL.
For these financially unconstrained agents, independent of whether they are bor-
rowers or depositors, their input decisions only depend upon their productivity
signal. However, because of the gap between RL and RD, there may be agents
who would like to be borrowers at the high capital to labor ratio qD and deposi-
tors at the low capital to labor ratio qL. In such a case, these entrepreneurs are
constrained to have kA = a.7
3.4 Outside the stationary equilibrium
As pointed out above, proportional changes in the government liabilities are neu-
tral. Also, changes in government liabilities that permanently move the ratio of
liquid to illiquid liabilities (h/b) are associated with diﬀerent steady states. In this
section, we look at how the economy moves between these stationary situations.
In particular, assume the economy is at the stationary equilibrium characterized
by the number h. Then, the central bank announces unexpectedly a permanent
change in this number, say, an increase to bh > h. In the period of the announce-
ment, the total amount of liabilities (X) is fixed, so, this change could be achieved
by increasing liquid liabilities to bH = bhX > H and reducing illiquid liabilities tobB = (1− bh)X < B through an open market operation. After that, the liabilities
of the central bank are permanently split between liquid and illiquid liabilities in
order to match the new values of bh and bb satisfying bh+bb = 1.
The unexpected nature of the announcement means that in the first period of
the transition, the population starts with the distribution of assets and productiv-
ities of the old steady state, λ. With the new supplies of government liabilities,
the conditions to be satisfied in the first period of the transition are the market
7The nature of this constraint is diﬀerent from the financial restriction men-
tioned before and it is just a consequence of the gap between borrowing and lend-
ing rates imposed by the reserve requirement. Nevertheless, in the simulations we
run in the following section it turns out that agents for which k = a represent a
very small fraction of entrepreneurs (less than 1 percent of all entrepreneurs).
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clearing condition for deposits
1
ρ
bH = P1 Z
W1
aλ (da× dz) + P1
Z
E1
max [0, a− k1 (a, z)]λ (da× dz) , (7)
and the market clearing condition for loans
bL = P1 Z
E1
max [0, k1 (a, z)− a]λ (da× dz) , (8)
with bH + bB = X = H +B.
In these expressions, the subscript 1 denotes that these are variables for the first
period of the transition and bL is the new supply of loans to entrepreneurs computed
from the balance sheet of commercial banksµ
1
ρ
− 1
¶ bH = bL+ bB.
Notice the split between entrepreneurs and workers (the indices W1 and E1) may
change also in response to the diﬀerent composition of government liabilities.
Equations (7) and (8) are the market clearing conditions to find the price level
P1 and the interest rate R1 for the new values of reserves ( bH) and government
debt ( bB). Remember from section 3.2 that a proportional change in government
liabilities is necessary for monetary policy to be neutral. In the current case,
financial intermediaries learn that the supply of reserves have increased which gives
them the possibility of expanding credit. However, the government is borrowing
less through debt so banks will have to give these credits to entrepreneurs. Given
that the interest rate is a cost to entrepreneurs borrowing credits, the only way
to convince them to borrow more is by reducing the lending rate. This change
produces several eﬀects. First, some of the idle assets that were not used before
are now available to finance productive capital. Also, lower interest rates make
entrepreneurs borrow more assets, use more capital and produce more. With the
larger use of capital the demand for labor moves up and wages rise. Given the
concavity of the production function, howmuch the marginal productivity of labor,
and therefore wages, increases depends on how labor is allocated between highly
productive, constrained firms and low productive, unconstrained firms. Finally,
there is a reduction in the gap between borrowing and lending rates which, by
itself, enhances eﬃciency further.
As a consequence of these movements, the distribution of assets after the first
period changes because prices and allocations have been altered. From that point
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on, all variables and distributions will converge to the stationary equilibrium as-
sociated with the new monetary policy. To solve for this transition, we have to
work with the sequence of values of normalized prices pt, real wages wt and interest
rates Rt that satisfy the conditions (7) and (8) together with the evolution of the
distribution of assets. Once the sequence of pt is computed, we can calculate the
sequence of prices from
Pt = ptXt.
These computations cannot be carried out analytically. We perform them in the
following numerical exercise.
This basic mechanism just described resembles the one used in the limited
participation literature. In this literature, nonneutrality of money is achieved by
imposing two assumptions: (i) the nominal interest rate represents a cost to firms,
and (ii) households providing funds to firms cannot react to changes in monetary
policy. Thus, an injection of money by the central bank means that entrepreneurs
have also to absorb a larger amount of liquidity which forces interest rates to de-
crease and have the same expansionary eﬀects on economic activity. Because loans
to entrepreneurs are the only asset on the balance sheet of commercial banks, con-
dition (ii) is needed in these models so that households cannot undo the monetary
policy change. As compared with the limited participation literature, we substi-
tute condition (ii) by imposing a reserve requirement together with the existence
of government debt. In our model, the fractional reserve requirement links the
amount of liquidity in the economy to the supply of reserves while borrowing by
the government determines which part of that liquidity has to be absorbed by
entrepreneurs.
4 Simulations
For the simulations we use a logaritmic utility and a Cobb-Douglas production
function. Periods are assumed to be quarters. Table 2 includes the value of the
main parameters of the model. As we see by the value of θ, there exists decreasing
returns to entrepreneurs’ projects. These values are standard in the literature. The
reserve requirement ρ is 3 percent in the Unites States. The parameters related to
the distribution of ability shocks (Z) and transition matrices for them are included
in Table 3.
Table 4 reports the values of some key variables for the initial steady state
(column SS1). We start with a value of h which implies a ratio of liquid to illiquid
liabilities of h/b = 0.10. The economy rests in an equilibrium where the capital to
output ratio is 9.61. Furthermore, 12 percent of the population are entrepreneurs
and 88 percent workers. Of all entrepreneurs, 23 percent are constrained in their
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borrowing activities. The lending rate is 1.39 percent per quarter while the deposit
rate is 1.30 percent.
We conduct the experiment of permanently increasing the ratio of government’s
liquid to illiquid liabilities from 0.10 to 0.11. This monetary policy change can be
achieved by an open market operation where the central bank buys government
bonds outright in exchange for reserves. Column SS2 of Table 4 shows the new
steady state corresponding to that ratio. Such a change is associated with a
larger normalized price level. It is also associated with a smaller interest rate and
inflation rate, but the changes in these variables as well as the real magnitudes are
insignificant.
Although the two steady states are very close to each other, the transition
between them is far from being negligible due to the financial constraint that some
entrepreneurs face. Notice that in both steady states, aggregate real assets are
larger than aggregate productive capital, K. In particular, entrepreneurs only use
75 percent of all real assets as capital in the first stationary equilibrium and 77
percent in the second one. As mentioned above, the diﬀerence between assets and
the capital stock used in production is a consequence of the intervention of the
government in borrowing some of the units of account created by commercial banks
and signals one of the ineﬃciencies of the economy. It is of no surprise that the
gap between assets and capital is reduced when the central bank proportionally
decreases the importance of its certificates of deposits. The last column of Table
4 reports the value of the corresponding ratios found in the data. We observe all
the numbers to be very close to their empirical counterpart.
Agents in this economy do not anticipate the monetary policy change. This
means that the distribution of assets across agents at the first period of the tran-
sition is equal to the one corresponding to the old steady state. Figures 2 to 7
present the transition of an economy between the two steady states. They show
transitions for each variable as the percentage change with respect to the initial
steady state (except interest rates that are presented as diﬀerences with respect
to the old steady state). In the graphs, period 0 corresponds to the old steady
state while the exogenous monetary policy change occurs on period 1. Figure 2
shows that output rises on impact by around 1.1 percent of the value of the old
steady state. This variable stays at levels between 1.1 and 1.3 percent larger than
the original stationary equilibrium for around six quarters. Then it slowly decays
towards the new steady state which is close to the old one. In the same figure we
see that both capital and labor increase over the transition. We also observe that
assets decrease over the transition monotonically. The reasons for these movements
are explained below.
Figure 3 shows that on impact, interest rates decrease by 26 basis points at an
annual rate. Notice this is the typical change the Fed usually engineers to stimulate
the US economy in recessions. At the same time, wages increase and stay above
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the old steady state during the whole transition. This means that the increase in
labor is originated through an increase in the demand for labor. The normalized
price increases slowly towards the new steady state level. Figure 4 includes the
evolution of real financial assets. There is a reduction of deposits at the same time
as an increase in loans. As the government reduces its borrowing, the reduction in
interest rates puts downward pressure on the demand for real deposits as well as
the supply of loans increase as financial intermediaries try to divert resources to
entrepreneurs. This is why Figure 1 showed a reduction in the asset levels of the
economy.
Figures 5 and 6 give an idea of the internal mechanism generating this tran-
sition. Figure 5 presents the evolution of the fraction of entrepreneurs who are
financially constrained. At the initial steady state, this variable took a value of
23 percent. On impact, it changes to 22 percent and stays low relative to the old
steady state. This is a consequence of the reduction in interest rates which relaxes
the financial constraint for some entrepreneurs.
In Figure 6, we compare the responses of three entrepreneurs who diﬀer on their
initial level of accumulated assets. The top panel is generated as follows. First, we
look at the wealth distribution of assets in the initial steady state and compute the
average wealth level of the entrepreneurs in the bottom docile. Second, we follow
the trajectory of an entrepreneur with that level of assets who keeps a productivity
of z = 2.25 permanently. We choose this number because the largest fraction of
entrepreneurs (54 percent) is concentrated at that skill level. Because of his low
level of initial assets, this agent starts financially constrained. So he enters in
a path where he is accumulating assets and, given that he keeps a high level of
productivity, eventually becomes unconstrained. Third, we look at the trajectory
of this same agent but only after the monetary shock hits the economy in the first
period. The graph is the ratio of the two trajectories. So, the figure says that
this agent hires 3 percent more labor in the first period after the shock than what
he would otherwise have hired had the shock not occurred. The middle panel
represents the same exercise with an entrepreneur with the same skills but with
the average capital level of all entrepreneurs. The bottom panel represents the
entrepreneur with the average asset level of the top docile of the entrepreneurs.
To understand these graphs it is important to notice that these agents had diﬀerent
paths in the original steady state. The poor entrepreneur was accumulating assets
to reach a level that will make him unconstrained and run his firm at the optimal
level. He reached such a level of assets in period 12. Thus, as he was increasing
his wealth, so did his demand of capital and labor and his production. On the
contrary, the average and rich entrepreneurs were not constrained by their wealth
and were running their firms at the optimal level. The input demands for these
agents only depended on their skill level. As we maintained their productivities
constant they had constant profiles for output and inputs.
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During most of the transition, the reduction in the interest rate together with
the increase in wages, makes all agents work with a larger capital to labor ratio.
For the constrained entrepreneur, the decrease in the cost of capital outweighs the
wage increase and his financial constraint is relaxed. This allows him to hire more
inputs (6 percent more capital and 3 percent more labor on impact) and to produce
more (3.4 percent more on impact) than what he did in the old steady state. As
he accumulates more assets, his financial constraint is also relaxed in the future
which allows him to maintain higher levels of production and to propagate the
eﬀects of the shock over time. However, profits are small compared to his wealth
and assets still take the same time to reach the level in which he is unconstrained
(12 periods).
The average entrepreneur also takes advantage of the fall in the interest rate
since he is a borrower as well. He hires more capital and is able to produce more.
However, because he is financially unconstrained, the only eﬀect that works for
him is the change in prices. This is why their use of inputs expand much less
than the constrained entrepreneurs. As Figure 6 shows, the initial increase in his
capital is about half of the one for the constrained entrepreneur. This means that
the marginal productivity of labor increases little for him and he does not change
labor much on impact (about six times less than the constrained entrepreneur).
Finally, the change in the relative price of inputs makes the rich entrepreneur
clearly worse oﬀ. He reduces his labor demand and consequently his output.8
Finally, Figure 7 presents the evolution of idle capital. It shows a decrease in
unused resources of above 8 percent. This is the reason why output and capital
used rise on impact. The increase in the ratio of liquid to illiquid government
liabilities reduces the cost of using capital and productive entrepreneurs can use
more funds to acquire capital. It is in this sense in which we believe this mechanism
works under any other reason for having idle capacity, such as uncertainty about
demand at the time of capacity decisions or costs of operating at full capacity.
The idea is that there exists this other cost related to the financing of productive
capital which an expansionary monetary policy is able to reduce.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes two stylized facts, namely, the possibility of monetary shocks
significantly aﬀecting economic activity and the persistence of these eﬀects over
time. We first present evidence on how monetary policy shocks associated with
the Fed changing the composition of government liabilities may have an impact
on real activity through its eﬀects on capacity utilization. We then build up an
8Capital on this panel shows no movement because the grid at those levels of
wealth is very wide.
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economy where the monetary shocks propagate in a similar way as we find in the
data. Interestingly, the internal propagation mechanism in the model does not
rely on any sort of stickiness or adjustment costs. Our interpretation is based on
the way credit is created and how the monetary conditions in an economy aﬀect
the process of financial intermediation.
In our model, there is a distribution of agents who accumulate assets that may
be used as capital for production purposes. Capital is distributed among agents
through the use of nominal units of account created by financial intermediaries.
Entrepreneurs with a low level of assets borrow these units of account to obtain ex-
tra capital for their firms. In this sense, the nominal interest rate represents a cost
of production. Furthermore, there is no possibility of default in financial contracts
which force entrepreneurs to have enough collateral to cover potential negative
profits. Thus, borrowers with very low levels of accumulated assets relative to
their investment needs may be constrained in their borrowing activities.
When creating credit, banks have to satisfy reserve requirements. The mone-
tary authority provides these banks with two types of assets: reserves and bonds.
We show that the relevant policy variable to determine the level of interest rates
is the ratio of liquid (reserves) to illiquid (bonds) government liabilities. An ex-
pansionary monetary policy is associated with an increase in this ratio. Thus, an
outright open market operation by which the central bank buys government bonds
in exchange for reserves frees financial resources that can be used by entrepreneurs
to increase the amount of capital they employ. In particular, this monetary policy
shock relaxes the financial restriction of constrained entrepreneurs allowing them
to borrow more capital and to produce more. As the distribution of assets among
agents changes in time, this disturbance sets in motion a response of the economy
that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.
The basic propagation mechanism is the ability of constrained entrepreneurs to
accumulate more assets which relaxes their financial constraint also in the future
and allows them to maintain higher levels of production. Additionally, in our
simulation profits are small as compared to wealth so the distribution of asset
ownership takes time to change. This also contributes to propagating shocks over
time. We have shown that this mechanism is able to generate sizeable eﬀects on
real activity with responses that are persistent as we observe in the data.
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Appendix A: Data Sources
We used several sources of data. Financial data for liquid government liabilities
(H), government bonds (B), and loans (L) were taken from the Federal Reserve
Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts for the United States.9 We first constructed a
series of seasonally adjusted from the unadjusted levels (Tables L in the Accounts)
and the adjusted increments (Tables A in the Accounts). Then, we defined these
three variables as follows:10
H = Liquid government liabilities equal Depository institution reserves (Table
108, code 713113000) plus Vault cash of commercial banks (108, 723025000), and
Currency outside banks (108, 713125005).
B = Illiquid government liabilities equal U.S. government securities of financial
institutions (109, 763061005; 114, 443061005; 115, 473061005; 116, 603061005; 117,
543061005; 118, 513061005; 119, 573061005; 120, 223061005; 121, 633061005; 122,
653061003; 123, 553061103 and 563061103; 124, 403061005; 126, 673061705; 129,
643061703; and 130, 663061005) plus Municipal securities (109, 763062005; 114,
443062005; 116, 603062003; 117, 543062003; 118, 513062003; 120, 223062003; 121,
633062440; 122, 653062003; 123, 553062003; 124, 403062005; and 130, 663062003).
L = Loans are equal to Corporate equity (109, 763064105; 114, 443064075; 116,
603064105; 117, 543064105; 118, 513064003; 119, 573064105; 120, 223064005; 122,
653064000; 123, 553064103 and 563064103; and 130, 663064003), plus Corporate
bonds (109, 763063005; 114, 443063005; 116, 603063003; 117, 543063005; 118,
513063003; 119, 573063005; 120, 223063005; 121, 633063003; 122, 653063003;
123, 553063003 and 563063003; 124, 403063003; 129, 643063003; 130, 663063003;
and 131, 503063003), plus Mortgages (109, 763065005; 114, 443065005; 115,
473065105; 116, 603065103; 117, 543065003; 119, 573065003; 120, 223065005; 124,
403065005; 125, 413065005; 126, 673065005; 127, 613065000; 128, 623065003; and
129, 643065003), plus Open market paper (109, 763069175; 114, 443069105; 115,
473069103; 116, 603069103; 117, 543069100; 119, 573069105; 120, 223069103; 121,
633069175; 122, 653069100; 124, 403069603; 130, 663069103; and 131, 503069105),
plus Consumer credit loans (109, 723066000; 114, 443066003; 115, 473066000; 126,
673066000; and 127, 613066005), plus Other loans and advances (109, 763068005;
114, 443069505; 124, 403069255; 126, 673069005; and 127, 613069500).
D = Deposits are just the sum of the three variables specified above (D = H +
B + L).
9See Board of Governors [4].
10Here we report the number of the table and the code. The complete reference
for the table includes an L for Tables L and an F for Tables A. The complete codes
start with FL for Tables L and with FA for Tables A.
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The ratios defined in the paper (that is, h, b and h/b) had large trends until the
beginning of the 1990s when they stabilized. This is the moment when the Fed
began to target interest rates. To make the numbers in Table 3 meaningful, the
column “Data” in that table was computed from a sample starting in the first
quarter of 1990 and ending in the third quarter of 2002, which was the last date
available.
Data on interest rates were taken from the Statistical Release H.15 of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (available at the elctronic address
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). These interest rates are:
RD = Interest on deposits. It is computed from the 3-month Eurodollar deposits
(London).
RL = Interest on loans. It is the computed from the Bank prime loan rate.
The sources for the rest of the variables are as follows:
FEDSEC = Fed holdings of government securities. This is equal to the seasonally
adjusted series of US government securities held by the Federal Reserve Banks
(Table L108, code 713061005 of the Flow of Funds Accounts).
NBR = Nonborrowed reserves. This series is taken from the Statistical Re-
lease H.6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/).
Capacity utilization rate. This series represents the capacity utilization rate in
the Manufacturing industry and was taken from Tables 7 and 8 of the Statistical
Release G.17 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/download.htm).
National account variables were taken from the FRED database (available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
Share of entrepreneurs. This number is taken from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), for the year 1994.
Gini coeﬃcients for wealth and income are also taken from the PSID, 1989.
29
Appendix B: Tables and Figures
Table 1
Regression of policy variables on monetary shock
Dependent variable, y(t)
FEDSEC NBR
constant 2.2433 0.5935
(5.914) (1.637)
y(t− 1) -0.1154 0.2764
(-1.227) (1.385)
y(t− 2) 0.0837 -0.2190
(0.966) (-1.764)
y(t− 3) -0.0092 0.0887
(-0.136) (0.981)
y(t− 4) -0.1388 0.0927
(-1.662) (0.919)
Monetary shock 0.4925 0.8070
(3.436) (2.959)
Results from OLS regression of variable y(t) on four lags and
the monetary shock. T-statistics based on White’s heteroske-
dasticity consistent variance matrix in parenthesis.
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Table 2
Parameters of the model values
Symbol Meaning Value
β Time preference 0.985
δ Depreciation rate 0.016
θ Span of managerial control 0.825
α Capital elasticity of output/θ 0.340
ρ Reserve requirement 0.030
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Table 3
Parameters of the distributions of shocks
Ability shocks Z
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
Distribution ψ of worker’s ability shocks
0.00 0.05 0.88 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Transition matrix Q for entrepreneur’s ability shocks
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2250 0 0.7500 0.0250 0 0 0 0 0
0.0100 0 0.0750 0.8000 0.0250 0 0 0 0
0.0500 0 0 0.0750 0.8500 0.0250 0 0 0
0.0250 0 0 0 0.1000 0.8500 0.0250 0 0
0.0125 0 0 0 0 0.1125 0.8500 0.0250 0
0.0125 0 0 0 0 0 0.1125 0.8500 0.0250
0.0125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1325 0.8500
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Table 4
Steady states
Symbol Meaning SS1 SS2 Data∗
h/b Reserves over government bonds 0.10 0.11 0.12
h Reserves over assets 0.02 0.02 0.03
b Government bonds over assets 0.23 0.21 0.24
RD Interest on deposits (percent) 1.30 1.28 1.17
RL Interest on loans (percent) 1.39 1.37 1.83
p Normalized price level 0.07 0.08 -
µ Inflation (percent) 0.32 0.29 0.54
K/Y Productive capital over output 9.61 9.65 12.2
K/d Capacity utilization rate 0.75 0.77 0.82
H/(PY ) Reserves over nominal output 0.30 0.29 0.24
B/(PY ) Gov. bonds over nominal output 2.98 2.64 1.94
Share of entrepreneurs 0.12 0.12 0.10
Share of constrained entrepreneurs 0.23 0.21 -
Gini wealth 0.63 0.63 0.77
Gini income 0.27 0.26 0.45
∗ See Appendix A for a description of the data.
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